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Critical Exchange
ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF POETRY, ED. JOHN GIBSON
by A. J. Nickerson
T he PhilosoPhy of PoeTry. “Of” intimates something more than copular coexistence. This could be the systematic and propositional attempt 
to define what poetry is, subjecting poetry to philosophical investiga-
tion with its distinctive questions and processes of inquiry. As a literary 
critic, however, I heard the title The Philosophy of Poetry as an assertion 
of poetry’s discursive, cognitive value: it suggests there are varieties of 
philosophic thought, of which one might be the poetic organization of 
understanding. Between these inversions there are less exclusive (and 
less partisan) ways of imagining the relationship. The philosophy of 
poetry could be the attitude it assumes toward the world—its disinter-
ested revelation of truth, or ruminating consideration of it, or resistance 
to its pressures. It could be the Aristotelian virtue of practical poetic 
commitment to propriety, discipline, and truthfulness. Or, following 
Heidegger, it could be poetry’s metaphysical work of measuring man’s 
existence in the world.
One might expect (I did) this ambiguous coordination to be a strate-
gic move to reconfigure the relation of philosophy and poetry through 
attention to the subtleties of their coexistence and interference. In 
practice, however, this volume is oriented away from the idiosyncratic 
particulars of poetry and toward establishing the philosophy of literature 
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as a subset of philosophy, using poetry to correct the earlier prose-heavy 
studies and so “attain the expansiveness and openness our friends in 
other areas of analytic aesthetics have already achieved.”1 The book 
presupposes analytic philosophy to be the basic and proper model of 
enquiry. Ten of the twelve essays are by members of philosophy facul-
ties: John Gibson, Peter Lamarque, Ronald de Sousa, Jesse Prinz and 
Eric Mandelbaum, Sherri Irvin, Simon Blackburn, Anna Christina Soy 
Ribeiro, Roger Scruton, Alison Denham, and Richard Eldridge. Only 
Angela Leighton and Tzachi Zamir represent the literature department. 
They draw on a few philosophers (Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Wollheim) 
and repeatedly cite other contributors (Richard Eldridge’s Beyond 
Representation: Philosophy and the Poetic Imagination, Peter Lamarque’s The 
Philosophy of Literature).
This in-house—or rather, in-faculty—execution of a project that is 
necessarily cross-disciplinary is symptomatic of a low view of what liter-
ary criticism and literature might contribute to philosophy. This finds 
expression in the volume’s confessed reluctance to engage with poetry. 
De Sousa—at once pleased and saddened by his antipathy but typi-
cal in it—describes how he once “did passionately want to be a poet” 
but is now “only an occasional and always a highly prejudiced reader 
of poetry” (p. 37). Irvin in her essay on “unreadable poems” laments 
having to “consort with so many unfriendly poems” (p. 92). On the 
occasions when poems are included, choice seems circumscribed by a 
limited and popular acquaintance with poetry—Wallace Stevens, T. S. 
Eliot, and “The Red Wheelbarrow.”
Unsurprisingly, this inattention to poetry corresponds to a clumsi-
ness in handling texts. This is evident in the apparently hasty editing 
of the volume, which is riddled with misspellings, lacunae, and ugly 
footnoting. The literary critic will also find it evident in some crude 
oversimplifications about literary history (Lamarque’s discussion of 
“supposed commonplaces about poetry”) and poetic effect (Prinz and 
Mandelbaum: “Rossetti uses rhyme and repetition to create a sense of 
rhythm” [p. 72]).
This hampers the project of an analytic critique of poetry. Prinz and 
Mandelbaum’s essay “Poetic Opacity: How to Paint Things with Words” 
is a badly spliced and uneven composition. It is also desperately limited 
in its appreciation of poetic effect: we are told “the form of a poem 
is heightened,” “enjambment heightens the reader’s attention,” “bodily 
imagery . . . heightens the readers’ attention to sensation,” and “percep-
tual idioms . . . heighten the sensual feel” (pp. 79–81; my italics). This 
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heightening argues for an intensification of attention without observing 
the intricately differentiated phenomena, or explaining how or why 
these compositional aspects have this effect on our interest and engage-
ment, or why they direct our embodied, subjective awareness of poetic 
experience. Consequently, this impoverished lexicon constrains the 
degree of refinement possible in aesthetic evaluation and, therefore, 
in the analytic study of poetry.
At this point the literary critic will ask why these philosophers have 
not consulted the work on the philosophy of poetry already sitting 
on the shelves of literature departments. Indeed, one could offer an 
alternative select bibliography reflecting the busy contemporary discus-
sion among literary critics about the relationship between knowledge 
and poetry. Key contributions would include: Clive Scott’s The Poetics of 
French Verse (among many things, an exemplary investigation into the 
phenomenology and meaningfulness of reading poetry); Derek Attridge’s 
The Singularity of Literature (unusually concentrating a discussion of the 
philosophy of literature around poetry rather than prose); Michael 
Wood’s Literature and the Taste of Knowledge; Simon Jarvis’s Wordsworth’s 
Philosophic Song; Angela Leighton’s On Form: Poetry, Aestheticism, and the 
Legacy of a Word; Peter McDonald’s Sound Intentions; and Ewan Jones’s 
Coleridge and the Philosophy of Poetic Form. These volumes are concerned 
with philosophy’s project of defining poetry but also entertain the pos-
sibility of poetry-as-philosophy.
But before the literary critic joins Gibson’s colleague from the litera-
ture department in condemning philosophy as “arrogant and cantan-
kerous” (p. 1) in its assumption of the entire field of the philosophy of 
poetry, it is chastening to consider why this philosophical investigation 
so consistently disregards the contribution of literary criticism. Literary 
criticism is neither poetry nor philosophy, yet—frequently in crisis over 
its own disciplinary identity—it veers between one and the other, emulat-
ing their practices and, too often, doing neither well. Sometimes literary 
discussions of a poem’s meaning are in effect a staggered reading aloud 
of the poem on the page, the chapter animating in slow motion the 
poem’s own activity. What sets out to find an exactly nuanced under-
standing of the poem becomes a deictic referral to the poem to explain 
itself. On other occasions literary criticism pines for the confidence of 
philosophy and adopts a more “philosophical” approach. Unfortunately, 
the philosophers literary critics favor (Stanley Cavell, Jacques Derrida, 
Michel Foucault) are those largely disregarded within the philosophy 
department. Literary criticism becomes a weak form of pseudophilosophy 
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or an oddly inarticulate way of talking about poetry that cannot extract 
its argument from its subject—in either case, it seems an invalid mode 
of inquiry to the philosopher.
While the works mentioned above represent accomplished dis-
cussions of the question, these methodological bifurcations remain 
evident. Indeed, the two literary critics included in The Philosophy of 
Poetry—Leighton and Zamir—represent the polarities of literary-critical 
practice. Leighton (like McDonald) puts the extragrammatical playful-
ness of poetic language—punning, rhyming, deliberate overliteralism 
and overemphasis, metaphor, and stylish syntactical formations—to use 
in the creation of an argument about the nature of poetic knowing. 
Conversely, Zamir (like Jarvis and Scott) is more philosophically inclined, 
articulating the meaningfulness of poetry with technical precision and 
in robust dialogue with philosophic thought. The difficulty of writing 
about poetry in a way that is sympathetic to its subtleties and particu-
larities—moving away from the abstractions of philosophy, yet without 
simply replicating the poetic construction of meaning—is ultimately the 
difficulty of resolving the ongoing identity crisis of literary criticism, of 
finding and maintaining its disciplinary distinctives and practices.
But while an unintended virtue of this collection is that it forces the 
literary critic to reflect on his or her professional habits, it also explicitly 
demands a reconsideration of philosophical practice. The first four essays 
are concerned with the “difficulty” of poetry. Perhaps to a philosopher 
new to poetry (for whom the collection is intended) these will be a use-
ful introduction to some theoretical problems, but to a regular reader 
of poetry the volume becomes most challenging and engaging when 
Simon Blackburn asks, “Can an analytic philosopher read poetry?” It 
asks how an analytic philosopher can read poetry—whether they have the 
skills, knowledge, patience, and sympathy to do so (some of these essays 
suggest that the answer is “No”). But it also asks, more quietly, whether 
he can do so without compromising himself as an analytic philosopher.
In some ways the essays dodge the question. Whether it was the 
result of briefing or coincidence, these essays consistently focus on 
“the modernist, the avant-garde, and the experimental” (p. 5). Gibson’s 
introduction argues that in the modern, difficult poem, “the loss of a 
surface [narrative, expressive, imagistic] that can be read naively thus 
turns out to be no loss to poetry” (p. 10): this “pure” poetry, free from 
the poetical clutter of previous centuries, facilitates the most direct and 
strenuous investigation of the philosophy of poetry. But this misguidedly 
assumes that the sensuous form of the poem (meter, rhythm, sound, 
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rhyme, stanza form, and so on) is irrelevant to its truthfulness. Modern, 
difficult poetry is indeed more hospitable to this philosophical project to 
discover repeatable, translatable meanings in its apparently lesser interest 
in sensuous form; it does not follow, however, that its meaningfulness 
actually can be discovered through the methods of analytic aesthetics. 
Ironically, it is the poetry absent from this collection, implicitly deemed 
“easy” (Tennyson, say, or Swinburne) because of its foregrounding of 
nonsemantic forms of expression, that presents the greatest challenge 
to the philosopher to establish what poetry means and how it articulates 
that meaning in a specifically poetic way
Again, in philosophy’s clumsiness and oversimplifications there is a 
yet greater warning for the literary critic. Much current literary criticism 
centers on the cognitive character of poetry in relation to its phenom-
enological and sensuous aspects. This attempts to defend the aesthetic’s 
contribution to human life, the significance of nonsemantic forms in 
our perception of the world, by articulating it in terms accessible to 
philosophy. But it risks compromising the literariness of its investigation 
and overlooking categories of poetic value unavailable within a philo-
sophical framework.
The best essays in the volume—the most subtle and stylish, the most 
sensitive to the competing demands of philosophy and poetry—endeavor 
to find a sympathetic way of articulating the contribution of poetry to 
our understanding of the world. It is notable that while they come from 
very different authors (Scruton the philosopher, Leighton the literary 
critic/poet, Zamir the literary philosopher) and handle very different 
material (Heidegger, Henry James, Paradise Lost) they each conclude 
that poetry refreshes knowledge. Scruton’s excellent essay, “Poetry and 
Truth,” understands truth “as revelation, as the unconcealing of what is, 
in our instrumental and scientific ways of dealing with the world, hid-
den from us” (p. 154). For Scruton, poetry gives understanding of the 
world through its disclosure of what is ever present but unseen. Crucially, 
poetic “truth” is not the final proposition that can be made about this 
new world but the process of revelation itself, the gradual attaining of 
a true vision. Leighton argues for a similarly present-continuous idea 
of poetic “knowing,” imagined as explicitly and playfully antagonistic to 
philosophy, demanding that it “include process and replay, wonder and 
unknowing, seeing and listening” in its definition of knowledge (p. 178).
Zamir’s essay on the epistemology of Paradise Lost provides a nice 
companion piece. It attempts to formulate the exact nature of poetic 
antagonism toward philosophy and explores how philosophy responds 
314 Philosophy and Literature
to this challenge. His compelling conclusion is that philosophy’s 
encounter with poetry accentuates disciplinary distinctives rather than 
initiating interdisciplinarity. This is not because the project of writing a 
“philosophy of poetry” fails, but because it reveals the precise, totalizing, 
and incompatible claims that each makes about its particular schema. 
Moreover, the interference of philosophy and poetry foregrounds what 
each discipline fails to account for and hence the need for a more 
thoroughgoing engagement with the other discipline in order to refine 
and defend their distinctive project.
As such, this collection confirms Zamir’s intuitions about what happens 
when philosophy encounters poetry. The philosophy-heavy content of The 
Philosophy of Poetry exposes the weaknesses of the philosophical project: 
clumsiness with the small things of poetry, insensitivity to sensuous forms 
of knowledge, commonplaces substituted for attention, a lexicon that 
facilitates abstraction but results in foreshortened aesthetic evaluation. 
But literary criticism’s absence is symptomatic of an even greater need 
to develop and defend its own disciplinary identity: at stake is our ability 
to recognize, value, and sympathetically articulate the various ways in 
which poetic expression enriches our participation in the world.
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